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Abstract 
In 2005, 3974 Canadians were on waiting lists for organ transplants and 275 patients 
died while waiting. Canada's organ shortage has led to calls for changes to Canada's 
organ donation system and its legal framework. Herein we examine an issue in which 
law reform could both increase the number of available organs and better align practice 
with respect for autonomy, a core value underpinning the Canadian legal system: the 
issue of family overrides of a valid donor consent to postmortem donation. That is, we 
examine what should happen when an individual consented to postmortem donation 
but the family would like to override that consent. First, we examine the requirements 
for valid donor consent. Second, we consider the legal status of family overrides of valid 
donor consent in relation to postmortem donation. Third, we describe the available 
data with regard to the practice of permitting families to override valid donor consent 
and discuss the possible reasons for this practice. Finally, we describe and defend the 
desired results with respect to law reform and describe the actions needed to realize 
these results. 
In 2005, 3974 Canadians were on waiting lists for organ transplants and 275 patients died 
while waiting.1 Canada's organ shortage has led to calls for changes to Canada's organ 
donation system and its legal framework. In this article, we examine an issue in which law 
reform could both increase the number of available organs and better align practice with 
respect for autonomy, a core value underpinning the Canadian legal system: the issue of 
family overrides of a valid donor consent to postmortem donation. That is, we examine 
what should happen when an individual consented to postmortem donation but the family 
would like to override that consent. In Part I, we examine the requirements for valid donor 
consent. In Part II, we consider the legal status of family overrides of valid donor consent in 
relation to postmortem donation. In Part III, we describe the available data with regard to 
the practice of permitting families to override valid donor consent and discuss the possible 
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reasons for this practice. In Part IV, we describe and defend the desired results with 
respect to law reform and describe the actions needed to realize these results. 
I. Valid Consent Requirements 
In the context of a paper on family override of valid donor consent, it is essential to first 
clarify the legal requirements for valid donor consent to postmortem donation. It is also 
important to look at this issue because many health care providers, donors, and substitute 
decision makers do not understand the legal requirements for a valid consent. Both 
substantive and procedural requirements must be considered. 
A. Substantive Requirements 
1. Age of donor giving the consent 
In order for consent to postmortem donation to be valid, the donor must first meet the age 
requirement in the applicable organ and tissue donation legislation. Generally mirroring 
the jurisdiction's age of majority, the age is either 192 or 18,3 with the following 
exceptions. In Ontario and Prince Edward Island, a donor 16 years or older can give 
consent to postmortem donation, while in Quebec, consent may be given by a donor who is 
14 years or older. In Manitoba, donors who are 16 or 17 years old may give a valid consent 
if their parents or legal guardians, who are normally also required to consent, are 
unavailable.4 With the exception of Prince Edward Island and Quebec, consent to 
postmortem donation given by an individual who did not meet the statutory age 
requirement is valid under the legislation if the person following it had no reason to believe 
the donor was underage. 
2. Capacity, voluntariness, and information 
It is clear from most organ and tissue donation legislation that the following conditions 
must be met for consent to be valid for purposes of inter vivos donation: the donor must be 
mentally competent to consent and the consent must be free and informed.5 However, 
these conditions are not found in the postmortem donation consent provisions of organ 
and tissue donation legislation. With the exception of Quebec, Prince Edward Island, and 
Manitoba, postmortem consent provisions state that a person of the appropriate age may 
consent6 to postmortem donation in a prescribed format, without explicitly listing any of 
the consent elements set out for inter vivos donation. In those jurisdictions that define 
“consent” in their statutory definition sections, the term “consent” is defined as “consent 
given under this act,” which indicates that no outside concept of consent should be read 
into the act.7 The meaning of “consent” as used in the postmortem donation provisions and 
what elements are implicitly required by the term have not been judicially interpreted. 
However, given that the explicit requirements for consent to inter vivos transplantation 
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were not used in the postmortem consent provisions, an inference that could be drawn is 
that competence and free and informed decision making are not required for consent to 
postmortem donation. 
Although language about the elements of consent is included in the postmortem consent 
provisions of the uniform Human Tissue Donation Act recommended by the Uniform Law 
Conference of Canada, only Prince Edward Island, Quebec, and Manitoba explicitly address 
the elements. Prince Edward Island's Human Tissue Donation Act requires that the donor 
“understands the nature and consequences of transplanting tissue from his or her body 
after death” in order for his or her consent to be valid.8 However, under s. 3(2), the consent 
is valid if the person who acts on it has no reason to believe it was not informed. Article 
1399 of Quebec's Civil Code articulates the general rule that consent must be free and 
enlightened and this applies to consent to postmortem donation. Under Manitoba's Human 
Tissue Gift Act, a direction authorizing postmortem donation cannot be acted on if the 
person who intends to follow it has reason to believe the donor was not capable of 
understanding the nature and effect of the direction.9 
Therefore, it is clear that, in the context of inter vivos donation, the requirements of a valid 
consent are donor capacity and voluntariness and informed consent. It is not clear, in the 
context of postmortem donation, which (if any) of these elements are required for valid 
donor consent and there is a need for further work in this area. 
B. Procedural Requirements 
Canadian organ and tissue donation legislation, with the exception of Prince Edward Island, 
specifies the format in which postmortem donor consent must be given in order for it to be 
valid. If consent is not given in this format, then the donor has not given a valid consent 
under the applicable postmortem consent provision. In those jurisdictions that have a 
specific format for postmortem donor consent, all of the statutes permit consent to be given 
in writing at any time and the majority require the writing to be signed.10 What constitutes 
writing is clarified by provincial and territorial Interpretation Acts and their definition is 
essentially the same: “‘writing,’ ‘written,’ or any term of like import, includes words 
printed, painted, engraved, lithographed, photographed, or represented or reproduced by 
any other mode in a visible form.”11 A valid legal writing requires words documenting in 
any visible mode the consent of the individual to postmortem donation. Therefore, a signed 
donor card is a valid legal document for indicating consent to postmortem donation. 
In Saskatchewan, a jurisdiction which requires a signed writing, an individual is permitted 
to place an orange sticker with the words “organ and tissue donor” on their signed health 
card.12 Quebec issues organ donation information sheets and stickers with their health 
cards that state: “I authorize the retrieval of my organs and tissue after my death. I have 
advised my family: yes, no.” These stickers include a signature line, which states 
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underneath “signature of the donor or guardian of the donor aged under 14 years old.”13 
Both of these stickers meet the requirements for giving a valid consent for postmortem 
organ donation. In Nova Scotia and Ontario, signed provincial health cards contain the 
word “donor” and markers to document the fact that written consent has been registered 
with the government. These cards are also valid indications of consent, as they contain the 
word “donor,” which indicates the individual has consented and there is a signature. 
Organ and tissue donation legislation in 7 jurisdictions also define the term “writing” to 
include a will or other testamentary instrument, regardless of whether they are valid or 
whether probate has been granted.14 In addition, valid consent to postmortem donation 
can be given orally in the presence of at least 2 witnesses during the donor's last illness in 
most jurisdictions, while Manitoba allows consent to be given in this way at any time.15 
II. Legal Status of Valid Donor Consent and Family Override 
A. Common Law 
There are no Canadian court decisions that directly address the issue of family overrides of 
valid donor consent in the context of postmortem donation. However, the common law16 
does set out rules, rights, and duties with respect to dead bodies. Although it is a common 
law rule that a human corpse is not property, the common law also recognizes a right to 
possession of the corpse for the purposes of burial, in relation to an executor's legal duty to 
bury the deceased.17 If there is no executor, then the right of possession and 
corresponding duty to bury falls first to the spouse, and if there is no surviving spouse, then 
to the next-of-kin.18 Under the common law, as the dead body is not property, the 
expressed wish of an individual in regard to the disposition of his or her body after death is 
not legally enforceable or binding on his or her executor or next-of-kin, even if expressed in 
a will.19 In fact, unauthorized interference with an executor's or next-of-kin's “quasi-
property” right allows them to sue for damages, including damages for their emotional 
distress resulting from mutilation of the corpse during an autopsy that they did not 
authorize.20 However, this right to possession is not absolute and is “subordinate to the 
demands of justice or public good.”21 
Based on these common law rules to the issue of family overrides it might seem that 
physicians and hospitals have a general duty to respect the wishes of the family, as the 
expressed wish of the potential donor in regard to the disposition of his or her body is not 
legally enforceable. However, it is important to note here (to counter any reliance on the 
common law in support of a claim or demand for respect for a family override) that the 
common law is not applicable in this context, because the common law is subordinate to 
legislation.22 In the case of organ and tissue donation, provincial and territorial legislation 
has displaced the common law, and these statutes are the primary source of legal authority 
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for postmortem donation in all provinces and territories.23 We therefore turn now to the 
legislation. 
B. Legislation 
1. Criminal code 
Canada's Criminal Code24 contains a provision concerning respect for dead bodies. Under 
section 182(b) of the Criminal Code, it is a criminal offense to improperly or indecently 
interfere with or offer any indignity to a dead human body, whether buried or not. A 
codification of a common law offense, this rarely used section has been applied in cases 
involving sexual indecency to a corpse,25 disrespectful acts by neo-Nazis to Jewish 
gravestones,26 and the purposeful destruction of coffins containing human remains.27 The 
common law history of the offense indicates it was meant to prevent the sale of bodily 
parts from corpses, protect public health by criminalizing the leaving of dead bodies in 
public places, and deter other indignities to the corpse such as necrophilia.28 The lawful 
removal of organs authorized by valid donor consent, although opposed by family, would 
not attract criminal liability under this section given its purpose and the history of its 
limited use in Canada. 
2. Organ and tissue donation legislation 
a. Authority 
All provinces and territories except Quebec and Manitoba 
Although there are some significant variations, the postmortem donation consent regimes 
outlined in organ and tissue donation legislation share a number of fundamental 
characteristics.29 Under the legislation, a person who meets the statutory age requirement 
has the authority to consent to postmortem donation. His or her consent is full authority 
for the removal and use of body parts for transplantation.30 There is no legal requirement 
that the family must also consent.31 His or her consent is also binding authority: it must be 
followed unless a legal exception applies.32 The Canadian Law Dictionary defines “bind” as 
follows: “something that obligates or constrains the bound individual. A bind places one 
under legal duties and obligations.”33 “Binding” in turn “[a]s used in a statute, commonly 
means obligatory.”34 Family opposition does not fit within any legal exception. Therefore, 
the current practice of respecting family opposition where there is valid donor consent 
contravenes the law (except in Quebec and Manitoba, as discussed below). 
Manitoba 
In Manitoba, under The Human Tissue Gift Act, valid donor consent is full authority for 
physicians to remove the donor's organs and tissues for postmortem transplantation but 
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the consent is not binding.35 Therefore, it appears that it is legally permissible for 
physicians to respect family opposition if there is valid donor consent in Manitoba, as 
physicians are not legally required to follow the donor's consent. When faced with family 
opposition, physicians may choose whether or not to exercise their authority under the Act. 
Quebec 
In Quebec, the current law governing consent to postmortem donation is found in the Civil 
Code of Quebec, a statute which contains rules that govern “persons, relations between 
persons, and property.”36 As in other provinces and territories, the law allows adults (as 
well as minors 14 years and older) to authorize postmortem donation. The Code specifies 
that “the expressed wishes shall be followed, except for a compelling reason.”37 What 
constitutes a compelling reason is not defined in the Code and does not appear to have 
been judicially interpreted.38 Therefore, while the Code is explicit in establishing a legal 
duty to follow the donor's expressed wishes, it appears to be open to interpretation under 
the current law whether family opposition constitutes a compelling reason to not abide by 
them.39 
b. Statutory exceptions 
With the exception of Quebec, organ and tissue donation legislation in Canada contains 2 
statutory exceptions to the binding nature of valid donor consent. First, persons may not 
act on valid donor consent if they have reason to believe the donor subsequently withdrew 
his or her consent. Second, if the donor's death requires an investigation by a provincial or 
territorial coroner or medical examiner, valid donor consent is not actionable unless the 
medical examiner or coroner allows the procurement to proceed.40 
A third exception exists in all provinces and territories except Manitoba, Quebec, the 
Northwest Territories, and Nunavut.41 Generally, this exception states that if a 
postmortem gift (the body or body parts specified in the consent) cannot be used for the 
purpose in the consent, it shall be dealt with and disposed of as if no consent had been 
given.42 Valid donor consent is no longer binding if the donated body or body parts are 
unusable for any reason, eg, if the donor has leukemia or multiple sclerosis. For obvious 
reasons, this exception does not provide legal authority for family overrides of valid donor 
consent. 
Two additional statutory exceptions exist in Manitoba and Quebec. In Manitoba, a direction 
cannot be acted on if the person seeking to follow it has reason to believe the donor was 
not capable of understanding the nature and effect of the direction.43 As noted earlier, in 
Quebec, valid donor consent does not have to be followed where there is a compelling 
reason not to do so (although what constitutes a compelling reason is unclear in the law). 
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c. Good faith immunity clauses 
With the exception of Quebec, the Northwest Territories, and Nunavut, organ and tissue 
donation legislation contains good faith immunity clauses that provide personal liability 
protections. The wording of these provisions in most provinces is as follows: “No action or 
other proceeding for damages lies against any person for any act done in good faith and 
without negligence in the exercise or intended exercise of any authority conferred by this 
Act.”44 Therefore, persons are protected from civil liability where they could otherwise be 
liable, if they acted in good faith and without negligence when exercising their authority 
(under valid donor consent) to remove tissue for postmortem donation. Two quotes from 
previous Canadian cases are illustrative of the way in which the courts will understand 
“good faith”: 
    …the state of mind in executing a duty: the officer must have acted in “good faith,” ie, 
believing in facts which, if true, would have justified what he did.…The contrast is with an 
act of such a nature that it is wholly wide of any statutory or public duty, ie, wholly 
unauthorized and where there exists no colour for supposing that it could have been an 
authorized one. In such case there can be no question of good faith or honest motive.45 
    “Good faith” and its opposite, “bad faith,” import a subjective state of mind, the former 
motivated by honesty of purpose and the latter by ill-will.46 
The good faith immunity clauses in the organ and tissue donation legislation protect 
physicians in the context of postmortem organ and tissue donation if physicians act 
honestly, without malice, ill-will, and negligence, in the execution of their authority to 
remove organs or tissue, and if they have no reason to think that they are making a 
mistake.47 Ontario's good faith immunity provision is broader in that it does not require 
physicians to act “without negligence” for its protections to apply.48 It also protects both 
acts and omissions. 
3. Consent legislation 
Several provinces and territories have passed consent legislation related to health care that 
is separate from their organ and tissue donation legislation. However, such legislation does 
not alter the conclusions drawn in the preceding section, because either the organ and 
tissue donation legislation supersedes the consent legislation, or the consent legislation is 
silent or consistent with the organ and tissue donation legislation. Each of these 
possibilities is considered herein. 
First, consent to organ and tissue donation is primarily governed by the consent rules 
outlined in organ and tissue donation legislation. In British Columbia, Alberta, 
Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, the Yukon, Ontario, and Saskatchewan, organ 
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and tissue donation legislation defines consent as “a consent given under this act.”49 
Although this phrase has not been judicially interpreted, it supports the argument that 
organ and tissue donation legislation is intended to be a complete consent regime in these 
jurisdictions.50 Prince Edward Island's organ and tissue donation consent regime has 
primacy, as the province's Human Tissue Donation Act states that “consent to the removal 
of tissue for the purposes of this Act may be given in accordance with this Act, but not 
otherwise.”51 British Columbia's Human Tissue Gift Act has a provision stating that it is not 
affected by the province's Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act.52 In 
addition, health care consent legislation may also contain provisions stating that the 
legislation does not apply to consent to tissue donation, as is the case in Ontario, or that the 
legislation is subject to the province's tissue legislation and in case of conflicts, the tissue 
legislation prevails.53 
Second, consent legislation either is silent on the issue of tissue donation, creates additional 
rules relating to the authority to consent to inter vivos transplantation,54 or contains 
provisions barring substitute decision makers from consenting to tissue donation55 or 
requiring them to do so in accordance with the expressed wishes of the individual while 
capable.56 Nothing in the provincial and territorial health care consent statutes diminishes 
the binding nature of a donor's consent or grants family members the authority to override 
a valid donor consent given under provincial and territorial tissue legislation. 
C. Conclusion 
In all jurisdictions except Manitoba and Quebec, family members have no legal authority to 
override valid donor consent to postmortem donation. In Manitoba, physicians may legally 
choose to respect family opposition to donation even in the face of valid donor consent 
because donor consent is not binding. In Quebec, family members have legal authority to 
override valid donor consent if family opposition is a “compelling reason” not to follow 
donor consent. 
III. Current Practice with Regard to Family Overrides 
A. What Is Happening? 
A 2006 Canadian survey examined the attitudes of health care professionals in regard to 
valid donor consent to postmortem donation and family overrides.57 Sixty-nine percent of 
the health care providers believed that the wishes of the family or next-of-kin would be 
respected over the wishes of the donor (as recorded on a signed donor card or in a donor 
registry). A similar survey of public awareness and opinions indicated that 64% of 
Canadians believed that the wishes of the deceased (as recorded on a signed donor card or 
in a donor registry) are followed over the wishes of the family.58 These surveys do not 
provide concrete evidence as to how many organs are actually lost due to family overrides. 
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However, if the physicians (69%) and members of the public (36%) who believe that family 
overrides are being respected are correct, this would represent a significant disregard for 
donor wishes as well as a significant loss of potential donor organs. 
B. Why Is It Happening? 
1. Lack of understanding of the law 
One factor contributing to respect for family opposition when there is valid donor consent 
may be a lack of understanding of the law in this area. Physicians and organ transplantation 
programs may mistakenly think some expressions of intent do not constitute valid consent. 
For example, Alberta's Human Organ Procurement and Exchange Program, based in both 
Edmonton and Calgary, states on their Edmonton website that a signed donor card is only a 
record of the donor's wish to donate and the next-of-kin is required to give consent for 
donation to happen.59 However, a completed Alberta donor card, located on the back of 
the province's health card, is a valid indication of legally binding consent, as it has both 
words of consent and a signature. New Brunswick's Department of Health answers the 
question “Can my next-of-kin withhold permission even if my organ donor card is signed?” 
by explaining that under the Act, the person entitled to consent will be approached and 
discouraged from overriding the donor's known wishes. However, New Brunswick's signed 
donor card is a valid indication of legally binding consent, not a record of the donor's 
wishes, and the province's Human Tissue Gift Act does not entitle anyone else to refuse 
consent where there is valid donor consent.60 
Alternatively, physicians and programs may think that they are legally required to follow 
family overrides, as they may believe that valid donor consent is insufficient authority for 
organ procurement and final consent is required from the family. For example, the Yukon 
Organ Donation Program states that the family will be asked for final consent even if the 
donor has signed a registration card.61 There also appears to be confusion about the 
binding nature of valid donor consent. Ontario's Trillium Gift of Life Network recognizes 
that valid donor consent provides sufficient authority for organ procurement despite 
family opposition. Yet, their website states that a signed donor card “does not mean that 
the doctors must recover your organs” in answer to the question of why families can 
override a valid donor consent.62 In Prince Edward Island, valid donor consent is also 
binding.63 However, the government's website explains that “although not required by 
law, a physician will not engage in the organ retrieval process if the family is opposed.”64 
This statement is inaccurate in respect to its statement about the law in that valid donor 
consent is binding and the law requires physicians to follow the donor's valid consent even 
if the family is opposed. 
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Several public statements reflect confusion about the law or, at a minimum, may create 
confusion for others in regard to the law. In Nova Scotia, principles of Nova Scotia Organ 
and Tissue Donation Strategies include: 
    The wishes of the patient's family are of paramount importance. Consent for donation is 
always requested from the patient's substitute decision maker (legal next-of-kin). Prior 
discussion and documentation of an individual's wishes can facilitate and support the 
families' decision making process. Families who are aware of their loved one's wishes 
almost always support those wishes. Documentation of an individual's wishes is not used 
as a legal tool to override the next-of-kin's decision—the family has the final say.65 
Information distributed by Newfoundland's organ procurement program tells people that 
organ donation is a two-step process and instructs them to both sign a donor card and 
inform their family of their decision, as the family will be asked to give consent after the 
individual's death.66 On the Saskatchewan's government website, individuals interested in 
being organ donors are told they can place an “organ and tissue donor” sticker, as 
discussed previously, on their health card, but “the stickers themselves do not guarantee a 
donation—that decision is left to your next-of-kin.”67 
2. Concern for the feelings of the family 
Another motivating factor for respecting family opposition where there is valid donor 
consent may be a desire not to upset families. An explanation that is commonly given for 
why families can override valid consent is “respect for the feelings of grieving families.”68 
However, it has also been argued that the best way to respect the grieving family is not to 
ask them to consent to donation where there is already valid donor consent, as it places an 
undue burden of decision making on the family.69 Rather, the grief of families can still be 
addressed by informing them of the deceased's consent and offering them counseling and 
support where the family disagrees, as is the case with the Center for Organ Recovery and 
Education (CORE) program that operates in regions of Pennsylvania, New York, and West 
Virginia.70 
3. Fear of lawsuits by family 
Physicians and organ procurement agencies may fear civil liability if they proceed in the 
face of family opposition. However, with the possible exception of Quebec and its 
“compelling reason” exemption, physicians who act on valid donor consent in accordance 
with the applicable organ and tissue donation legislation are not exposed to civil liability 
even if the family opposes, as their actions are lawful and the family has no basis for legal 
action. As explained earlier, most jurisdictions provide further protection through good 
faith immunity clauses. Furthermore, we were not able to find any reported decisions of 
physicians being successfully sued by families for following a valid donor consent. 
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4. Public perception 
Organ procurement and transplantation programs may be concerned that following the 
donor's valid consent over the wishes of the family may have a negative impact on the 
public's perception of their program. However, the surveys cited above indicate that a very 
strong majority of Canadians surveyed believe that valid donor consent should be followed: 
89% of the public believed that the wishes of the donor should be respected.71 A recent 
report by Ontario's Citizens Panel on Increasing Organ Donations concluded after its public 
consultation process that “both in discussions and in survey results, the position of 
Ontarians was unanimous—they want their wishes respected and overridden by no 
one.”72 This suggests that there would be no negative impact on public perception (indeed, 
the impact of respecting donor consents would likely be positive). 
IV. Recommendations for Reform 
With the exception of Manitoba and possibly Quebec, organ and tissue donation legislation 
does not permit valid donor consent to be overridden by families. This statutory position 
enjoys strong public support, as evidenced by further results from the 2006 survey 
mentioned above. This statutory position is also ethically sound, as it is supported by the 
principle of autonomy, the recognition that the donor has interests which survive past 
death and should be respected, and the substantial benefit of prolonged or improved 
quality of life experienced by transplant recipients. It has been argued that respecting the 
grieving family's desire not to donate is justifiable because it is family interests that are 
impacted the most by organ donation, whereas the donor is dead.73 Critics of this 
argument contend that failing to respect the donor's valid consent violates his or her 
autonomy and there are individual interests that survive death, such as the expressed 
wishes of the deceased in a will, that are respected despite family opposition74 and, as has 
been noted in the literature, the altruistic giving of one's organs and tissues can be argued 
to be a more personal and intimate decision than the disposal of one's property in a will 
and deserves equal, if not more, respect.75 Lastly, just as coroners' legislation permits 
forensic autopsies without family consent because of larger societal interests in justice,76 
provincial and territorial organ and tissue donation legislation that makes valid donor 
consent full and binding authority for donation and transplantation regardless of the 
family's wishes can be said to reflect the larger public interest in respecting individual 
autonomy and prolonging life. 
By ensuring that current practice is aligned with the law, the intent of both the donor and 
the legislation will be realized: more lives will be saved or improved. The grief of the family 
need not be ignored as supports can be put in place to help families that oppose donation 
understand the implications of their loved one's consent.77 A combination of law and 
policy reform, practice reform, and education is recommended below to achieve a 
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consistent and coherent approach that respects valid donor consent and maximizes 
postmortem organ procurement from donors who have given valid donor consent. 
A. Law Reform 
In 1987, when the Uniform Law Conference of Canada was considering amendments to its 
uniform tissue donation statute, it was recommended that “the next-of-kin should not be 
able to countermand the wishes of the deceased.”78 It was further recommended that this 
issue be addressed through education rather than through law reform, as the legislation 
was sufficient. However, given the obviously limited success of education alone in the past 
20 years to rectify the situation, as evidenced by the multitude of government and organ 
donation program websites that still state that the family can override valid donor consent, 
law reform should be undertaken in addition to education. We recommend that: 
1 
    The legal requirements (substantive and procedural) for a valid consent should be clearly 
set out in organ and tissue donation legislation. In particular, to reduce the potential for 
uncertainty, valid forms of “writing” should be clearly identified in regulations (made 
under organ and tissue donation legislation), eg, that “writing” includes organ donor cards. 
Further legal research is needed to examine what the substantive requirements should be 
for valid consent to postmortem donation. This research should consider the possible 
consequences of including informed consent as a requirement (eg, how such a requirement 
would affect the format and process for giving consent to postmortem donation). 
2 
    The word “binding” should be explicitly defined in organ and tissue donation legislation 
(ie, “binding” means the consent must be followed unless clearly articulated statutory 
exceptions are met). Manitoba should add the word “binding” to its postmortem donor 
consent provisions. All jurisdictions that have “binding” consent should have an exception 
similar to section 9 of Nova Scotia's Human Tissue Gift Act, which provides for 
circumstances in which the organs and tissues are unusable. 
3 
    Quebec should clarify that family opposition is not a compelling reason not to follow the 
donor's wishes expressed in a valid consent. 
B. Policy Reform 
Policy reform is needed so that policies and protocols regarding organ donation and 
procurement clearly and accurately reflect the law; specifically, that valid donor consent 
must be followed and cannot be overridden by the family (except in Manitoba and Quebec). 
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The policy statements of British Columbia's Transplant Society, an agency of the provincial 
health services authority that directs, delivers, or contracts for all organ transplant services 
in British Columbia, should be considered a possible Canadian model for policy reform. 
This Society's website accurately reflects the law in this area and clearly states that their 
registration form is valid legal consent under British Columbia's Human Tissue Gift Act. 
According to their website, the medical staff will always follow valid donor consent and the 
family will be approached with a copy of the donor's valid consent to inform them of the 
donor's decision.79 The Society's experiences with their policy could be used to inform the 
creation of policies throughout Canada. 
C. Education and Public Awareness 
Legal education and public awareness programs will be crucial to the success of efforts to 
inform all relevant stakeholders that the current practice of respecting family opposition 
over valid donor consent is not legally acceptable. The current law should be taught in 
relevant health professional degree programs, such as nursing and medicine, and should 
form part of continuing education programs for health professionals working in this field. 
Once policy reform is in place, public awareness of the legally binding nature of valid donor 
consent—and the benefits of giving such consent, such as saving lives and reducing the 
burden of decision making on one's family—should be increased and included as part of 
organ donation awareness programs. Public information should be correct and any 
necessary changes should be made to websites and other media. 
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